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| Author: | Norde, H. Potters, J. |
| Title: | Equilibrium selection and consistency |
| Journal: | Games and Economic Behavior
1996 : FEB, VOL. 12:2, p. 219-225 |
| Index terms: | GAMES ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR STRATEGY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In this paper the authors show that, for two important classes of strategic games , namely the class of mixed extensions of finite games and the class of games with compact and convix strategy spaces and continuous-concave payoff functions, equilibrium selection is incompatible with One Person Rationality, Consistency and (restricted) Non-Emptiness. In many cases the set of Nash equilibria is too large and contains - from a strategic point of view - unreasonable equilibria (e.g. equilibria using weakly dominated strategies). |
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