search query: @author Rebello, M. / total: 5
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| Author: | Noe, T. Rebello, M. |
| Title: | Asymmetric information, managerial opportunism, financing, and payout policies |
| Journal: | Journal of Finance
1996 : JUN, VOL. 51:2, p. 637-660 |
| Index terms: | INFORMATION POLICY FINANCE |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors examine corporate issuance and payout policies in the presence of both adverse selection and managerial opportunism. The results establish the importance of the locus of decision control in the firm. When shareholders determine policies, debt financing is always optimal in the presence of either adverse selection or managerial opportunism. However, when both of these problems are simultaneously present, equity issuance can become an optimal signaling mechanism. When managers determine policies, a reversed hierarchy may be obtained. |
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