search query: @author Powell, R. / total: 5
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| Author: | Powell, R. |
| Title: | Bargaining in the shadow of power |
| Journal: | Games and Economic Behavior
1996 : AUG, VOL. 15:2, p. 255-289 |
| Index terms: | GAMES ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR BARGAINING |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Often a bargainer can use some form of power -- legal, military, or political -- to impose a settlement. How does the "outside" option of being able to impose a settlement, albeit at some cost, affect the bargaining? And, how does the probability that the bargaining will break down vary with the distribution of power between the bargainers? These questions are examined by adding the option of imposing a settlement to Rubinstein's game of dividing a pie. Each actor can accept an offer, make a counteroffer, or try to impose a solution. |
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