search query: @author Eswaran, M. / total: 5
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| Author: | Eaton, B. C. Eswaran, M. |
| Title: | Technology-trading coalitions in supergames |
| Journal: | RAND Journal of Economics
1997 : SPRING, VOL. 28:1, p. 135-149 |
| Index terms: | TECHNOLOGY TRADE CO-OPERATION COMPETITION COMPANIES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper attempts to explain why rival firms often share their technologies. The paper shows that the trading of technical information can be sustained as an equilibrium in supergames. The strategy of ejecting a cheating firm from a technology-trading coalition better facilitates trading than does a strategy in which cheating results in the dissolution of the coalition. Firms may form small coalitions, technology trading is often welfare improving. |
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