search query: @author Lee, W. B. / total: 5
reference: 2 / 5
| Author: | Galloway, T. M. Lee, W. B. Roden, D. M. |
| Title: | Banks' changing incentives and opportunities for risk taking |
| Journal: | Journal of Banking and Finance
1997 : APR, VOL. 21:4, p. 509-527 |
| Index terms: | RISK REGULATIONS INCENTIVES CONTROL SYSTEMS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | An effective regulatory system must control both bank's risk-taking incentives and its opportunities to take excessive risk, to maintain a sound banking environment. Traditionally regulators have utilized two complementary risk-control devices: bank charter value and regulatory supervision. This study documents the deterioration of the banking industry's risk-control system during the 1980s, and investigates the time-varying relation between a bank's ex-ante risk-taking incentives and its ex-post risk-taking behavior from 1977 to 1994. The study tests two hypotheses concerning the relation between risk incentives and risk behavior, using a market-to-book equity ratio to proxy for the bank's charter value and its risk-taking incentives. |
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