search query: @author Gromb, D. / total: 5
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| Author: | Burkart, M. Gromb, D. Panunzi, F. |
| Title: | Why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders |
| Journal: | Journal of Political Economy
1998 : FEB, VOL. 106:1, p. 172-204 |
| Index terms: | POLITICAL ECONOMY SHAREHOLDERS MERGERS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Posttakeover moral hazard by the acquirer and free-riding by the target shareholders lead the former to acquire as few shares as necessary to gain control. As moral hazard is most severe under such low ownership concentration, inefficiencies arise in successful takeovers. Moreover, share supply is shown to be upward-sloping. Rules promoting ownership concentration limit both agency costs . |
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