search query: @author Cyert, R. M. / total: 5
reference: 1 / 5
« previous | next »
| Author: | Cyert, R. M. Kang, S.-H. Kumar, P. |
| Title: | Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top-Management Compensation: Theory and Evidence |
| Journal: | Management Science
2002 : APR, VOL. 48:4, p. 453-469 |
| Index terms: | CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MERGERS TOP MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION THEORIES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors examine, both theoretically and empirically, top-management compensation in the presence of agency conflicts when shareholders have delegated governance responsibilities to a self-interested Board of Directors (BOD). The authors develop a theoretical framework that explicitly incorporates the BOD as a strategic player, models the negotiation process between the CEO and the BOD in designing CEO compensation, and considers the impact of potential takeovers by large shareholders monitoring the CEO-BOD negotiations. In equilibrium, internal governance by the BOD and external takeover threats by a large shareholder act as substitutes in imposing managerial control, especially in constraining management's profligacy in awarding equity-based compensation to itself. |
« previous | next »
SCIMA