search query: @author Core, J. E. / total: 5
reference: 3 / 5
Author: | Core, J. E. Larcker, D. F. |
Title: | Performance consequences of mandatory increases in executive stock ownership |
Journal: | Journal of Financial Economics
2002 : JUN, VOL. 64:3, p. 317-340 |
Index terms: | MANAGERS PROPERTY OWNERSHIP CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE |
Language: | eng |
Abstract: | The authors examine a sample of firms that adopt "target ownership plans", under which managers are required to own a minimum amount of stock. The authors find that prior to plan adoption, such firms exhibit low managerial equity ownership and low stock price performance. Managerial equity ownership increases significantly in the two years following plan adoption. The authors also observe that excess accounting returns and stock returns are higher after the plan is adopted. Thus, for the authors' sample of firms, the required increases in the level of managerial equity ownership result in improvements in firm performance. |
SCIMA