search query: @author DeFond, M.L. / total: 5
reference: 4 / 5
| Author: | Defond, M.L. Hung, M. |
| Title: | Investor protection and corporate governance: Evidence from worldwide CEO turnover |
| Journal: | Journal of Accounting Research
2004 : MAY, 42:2, p. 269-312 |
| Index terms: | Corporate governance Management Investor protection International |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Recent research asserts that an essential feature of good corporate governance (hereafter as: c-g.) is strong investor protection. This study aims to test this assertion by investigating whether these measures of investor protection are associated with an important role of good c-g: identifying and terminating poorly performing CEOs. The tests indicate that strong law enforcement institutions significantly improve the association btw. CEO turnover and poor performance, whereas extensive investor protection laws do not. In addition, it is found that in countries with strong law enforcement, CEO turnover is more likely to be associated with poor stock returns when stock prices are more informative. |
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