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Author:Morellec, E.
Smith, C.W. Jr.
Title:Agency conflicts and risk management
Journal:Review of finance
2007 : MAR, VOL. 11:1, p. 1-23
Index terms:financial institutions
investments
shareholders
risk management
Freeterms:agency conflicts
Language:eng
Abstract:In this paper, the relation btw. agency conflicts and risk management is analyzed incorporating both stockholder-debtholder conflicts and manager-stockholder conflicts. The costs of both underinvestment and overinvestment are shown to be essential in determining the firm's hedging policy. Especially, firms deriving more of their value from assets in place, although having lower costs of underinvestment, generally display larger costs of overinvestment etc.
SCIMA record nr: 267341
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