search query: @indexterm Fiscal policy / total: 505
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| Author: | Bucovetsky, S. |
| Title: | Public input competition |
| Journal: | Journal of Public Economics
2005 : SEP, VOL 89:9-10, p. 1763-1787 |
| Index terms: | Fiscal policy Competition Public sector Models |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the Nash (here as: N.) equilibria to a simple model of public input competition. Even though the regions (here as: regs.) are assumed identical, the equilibrium may not be symmetric. The problem with non-cooperative behaviour is not (only) that regs. invest too much, but that too many regs. may choose to invest. Depending on the parameter values, the N. equilibrium may be efficient, inefficient or may not exist. Better mobility among regs. leads to more aggressive competition. The analysis suggests that rents from public investment may be dissipated by governments' competition to attract mobile factors. |
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