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| Author: | Lee, S.-H. Oh, K. Eden, L. |
| Title: | Why do firms bribe? Insights from residual control theory into firms' exposure and vulnerability to corruption |
| Journal: | Management International Review
2010 : VOL. 50:6 p. 775-796 |
| Index terms: | bribery corruption control theory criminal law |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This article investigates why companies bribe government officials and why some companies pay more than others. Applying residual control theory, it is studied how governments practice residual rights of control, and how these rights affect the payment and size of bribes. The findings indicate that, at the company level, bribe size depends on how much a government can exercise residual rights of control and the company's threat point. At the country level, the type of corruption matters: pervasive corruption is positively related, while arbitrary corruption is negatively related, to bribes paid. |
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