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Author:Anderson, R. C.
Bizjak, J. M.
Title:An empirical examination of the role of the CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay
Journal:Journal of Banking and Finance
2003 : JUL, VOL. 27:7, p. 1323-1348
Index terms:Corporate finance
Chief executive officers
Regulations
Commercial law
Language:eng
Abstract:The authors examine whether greater compensation committee (CC) independence promotes shareholder interests and whether the CEO's presence on the CC leads to opportunistic pay structure. They find little evidence that greater committee independence affects executive pay. The results suggest that regulations governing committee structure may not reduce levels of pay or achieve efficiencies in incentive contracts.
SCIMA record nr: 253181
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