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| Author: | Besanko, D. Spulber, D. F. |
| Title: | Are treble damages neutral? Sequential equilibrium and private antitrust enforcement |
| Journal: | American Economic Review
1990 : SEP, VOL. 80:4, p. 870-887 |
| Index terms: | ANTITRUST PRIVATE SECTOR INDUSTRIAL LAW CARTELS COSTS PRICING STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | A model of private antitrust enforcement is presented in which the cartel has better information about its production costs than prospective buyers. Because consumers have incomplete information about cartel costs, they cannot accurately estimate the damage recovery from an antitrust action. They are able to infer cartel costs from the equilibrium pricing strategy of firms. The universal divinity criterion is used to characterize the sequential equilibrium. First, the sequential equilibrium model is set out, followed by neutrality of private antitrust under full information. The sequential equilibrium model under asymmetric information is presented and further characterized in the following sections. |
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