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| Author: | Kanatas, G. Qi, J. |
| Title: | Imperfect competition, agency, and financing decisions |
| Journal: | Journal of Business
2001 : APR, VOL. 74:2, p. 307-338 |
| Index terms: | CAPITAL MARKETS DEBT FINANCING |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors examine in a Cournot duopoly model the well-known view that short-term capital market debt can control managerial moral hazard. They show that short-term debt does not provide this discipline because of managment's manipulation of the information flow to the market. Shareholders may nevertheless prefer short-term debt because it motivates management to be more aggressive in the product market. |
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