search query: @indexterm LIQUIDATION / total: 59
reference: 34 / 59
Author: | DeAngelo, H. DeAngelo, L. |
Title: | Proxy contests and the governance of publicity held corporation |
Journal: | Journal of Financial Economics
1989 : JUN, VOL. 23:1, p. 29-60 |
Index terms: | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS STOCK OWNERSHIP BOARD OF DIRECTORS MANAGEMENT LIQUIDATION |
Language: | eng |
Abstract: | Analysis of sixty proxy contests for seats on the boards of exchange-listed firms during 1978-1985 shows that three years after the contest less than one-fifth of the sample firms remain independent, publicly held corporations run by the same management team. Proxy contests are typically followed by managerial resignations, even when dissidents fail to obtain a majority of board seats, and are often followed by sale or liquidation of the firm. The average stockholder wealth gains associated with proxy contests are largely attributable to gains by companies in which dissident activity leads to sale or liquidation. A dissident challenge poses a serious threat to incumbent managers. |
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