search query: @indexterm INCOMES / total: 594
reference: 120 / 594
Author: | Pirchegger, B. |
Title: | Costs and Benefits from Repricing Employee Stock Options |
Journal: | Schmalenbach Business Review
2002 : JAN, VOL. 54:1, p. 80-111 |
Index terms: | COSTS INCOMES PRICING EMPLOYEES STOCK OPTIONS |
Language: | eng |
Abstract: | A principal-agent model is used to analyze whether reprising stock option contracts can be beneficial for the contracting parties. A principal employs an agent and offers him an exogenously given contract that includes a fixed compensation payment as well as stock options. After the contract is signed, the agent performs two efforts that the principal cannot observe. As soon as the first effort is completed, both parties observe a signal tha contains information about the final share price. At the end of the period the agent is paid according to his contract. The signal is assumed to reveal information about either an unobservable state of nature or the agent's first effort. For both settings a commitment scenario and a renegotiation scenario are compared. |
SCIMA