search query: @author Economides, N. / total: 6
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Author: | Economides, N. |
Title: | Quantity leadership and social inefficiency. |
Journal: | International Journal of Industrial Organization
1993 : JUN, VOL. 11:2, p. 219-237 |
Index terms: | EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS MODELS OLIGOPOLY |
Language: | eng |
Abstract: | A game of simultaneous free entry and sequential output choices is analyzed. Firms enter simultaneously in stage 1 by paying a fixed cost, and they choose output levels sequentially in subsequent stages. At the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game, the production level of a firm is decreasing with the order of the firm in the decision- making. The firm that is the last to choose output produces the same amount is a typical firm in the standard symmetric simultaneous-moves Cournot game. |
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