search query: @author Harrell, A. / total: 6
reference: 2 / 6
| Author: | Harrell, A. Harrison, P. |
| Title: | An incentive to shirk, privately held information, and manager's project evaluation decision |
| Journal: | Accounting, Organizations and Society
1994 : OCT, VOL. 19:7, p. 569-577 |
| Index terms: | INFORMATION MANAGERS PROJECT EVALUATION |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | A significant body of research indicates that managers often continue projects which logically should be discontinued to prevent subsequent losses to their firms. Affective explanations are usually provided for these apparently illogical decisions; for example, feelings of personal responsibility may bias the managers' evaluation of a project. In contrast, this study employs two agency theory concepts to investigate whether a rational explanation may exist for these decisions. |
SCIMA