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| Author: | Neus, W. |
| Title: | Realinvestionen, Finanzinvestionen und Anreizverträge |
| Journal: | Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft
1996 : VOL. 66:9, p. 1127-1147 |
| Index terms: | AGENCY THEORY INCENTIVES PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS ASSETS CORPORATE FINANCE |
| Language: | ger |
| Abstract: | In an agency-theoretic view on an owner-manager relationship, emphasis is typically given to effort incentives. Widely held corporations substantially invest in financial assets. Therefore, incentives to selct an adequate portfolio must be given, as well. The interrelation of the effort and the portfolio problem under certain circumstances leads to the irrelevance of incentive contracts with respect to the manager's effort decision. Futhermore, the budget contains too much financial slack. |
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