search query: @author Eaton, B. C. / total: 6
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| Author: | Koss, P. A. Eaton, B. C. |
| Title: | Co-specific investments, hold-up and self-enforcing contracts |
| Journal: | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
1997 : MAR, VOL. 32:3, p. 457-470 |
| Index terms: | INVESTMENTS CONTRACTS ECONOMETRIC MODELS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | General model is offered, of the hold-up problem when investments are co-spesific. There are no information asymmetries and agents are risk neutral. The division of the surplus arising from exchange is determined by Nash bargaining with outside options. It is demonstrated that reciprocal exposure to specific assets achieved via the partial redistribution of specific investment cost to the potentially opportunistic party is serving as a credible commitment to mutually advantageous exchange. |
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