search query: @author Glover, J. / total: 6
reference: 4 / 6
« previous | next »
Author:Arya, A.
Fellingham, J.
Glover, J.
Title:Teams, repeated tasks and implicit incentives
Journal:Journal of Accounting & Economics
1997 : MAY, VOL. 23:1, p. 7-30
Index terms:ACCOUNTING
INCENTIVES
ECONOMICS
Language:eng
Abstract:In a team setting, wherein only group performance is tracked, the authors show that muted incentive contracts may be sufficient to motivate team members. By having the team repeat a task, explicit (contractual) incentives can be substituted by implicit incentives team members provide to each other. The authors also study an example in which, despite uncorrelated individual performance measures being available, it is optimal to condition each manager's pay on both managers' performance. This can be viewed as creating a group performance measure.
SCIMA record nr: 160198
add to basket
« previous | next »
SCIMA