search query: @indexterm SEARCH COSTS / total: 6
reference: 4 / 6
| Author: | Bijl, P. |
| Title: | Entry deterrence and signaling in markets for search goods |
| Journal: | International Journal of Industrial Organization
1997 : NOV, VOL. 16:1, p. 1-19 |
| Index terms: | SIGNALING MARKETS SEARCH COSTS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper studies entry in markets for search goods. Signaling through prices is studied both when an entrant's quality is private information and when it is common knowledge to the entrant and incumbent. When consumers visit a store, they are assumed to observe quality and have an option of continuing to search but at a cost. When search costs are low, an entrant can signal high quality by setting a sufficiently high price, so that consumers who find out that its quality is low visit the incumbent. |
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