search query: @author Wruck, K. H. / total: 6
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| Author: | Dyck, I. J. A. Wruck, K. H. |
| Title: | Organization structure, contract design and government ownership: A clinical analysis of German privatization |
| Journal: | Journal of Corporate Finance
1998 : SEP, VOL. 4:3, p. 265-299 |
| Index terms: | ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE PRIVATIZATION GERMANY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In the paper, the role that organization structure and contract design played in resolving economic and political problems is examined in connection with the German privatization process. It is found that German officials structured organizations and contracts in a way that made credible the government's commitment to rapid privatization. This credibility served to protect the process from political and social opposition. In addition, it enabled Germany to attract talented private sector managers to its privatization effort. This began with the establishment of an independent privatization agency, the Treuhand. It culminated with the creation of another set of independent organizations called Management KGs, to which the Treuhand outsourced part of its restructuring, management and privatization work. |
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