search query: @author Ocasio, W. / total: 6
reference: 5 / 6
| Author: | Ocasio, W. |
| Title: | Institutionalized action and corporate governance: The reliance on rules of CEO succession |
| Journal: | Administrative Science Quarterly
1999 : JUN, VOL. 44:2, p. 384-416 |
| Index terms: | Executives Planning Organization theory Corporate governance Organizational behaviour USA |
| Freeterms: | Boards of directors |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In this paper, an institutional theory of action in exploring the consequences for formal and informal rules on the chief executive officer (CEO) succession process is followed. An analysis of the competing risks of insider vs. outsider CEO succession in the U.S. industrial corporations provides evidence that boards rely on both past precedents and formal internal labour markets for executive succession and the selection of insiders vs. outsiders as CEOs. Examined are the moderating effects of performance, late CEO departures, the founder's power, and board structure on reliance on rules. The rules show substantial inertia in the rules of CEO succession, consistent with an institutionalized action perspective. The findings suggest that rules both enable and constrain board decision making. |
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