search query: @author Spiegel, Y. / total: 6
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| Author: | Spiegel, Y. Yehezkel, Y. |
| Title: | Price and non-price restraints when retailers are vertically differentiated |
| Journal: | International Journal of Industrial Organization
2003 : SEP, VOL. 21:7, p. 923-947 |
| Index terms: | Retailing Consumer behaviour Competition |
| Freeterms: | Vertical restraints Customer restrictions |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors consider an intrabrand competition model with a single manufacturer (M) and two vertically differentiated retailers. They show that when markets cannot be vertically segmented and the cost difference between the retailers is not too large, M will foreclose the low quality retailer. When markets can be vertically segmented, M will impose customer restrictions and assign consumers with low willingness to pay to the low (high) quality retailer. |
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