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| Author: | Dietrich, F. List, C. |
| Title: | Strategy-proof judgment aggregation |
| Journal: | Economics and philosophy
2007 : NOV, VOL. 23:3, p. 269-300 |
| Index terms: | philosophy |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a preference-free concept of non-manipulability contrasting it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness, characterizing all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof (here as: str-prf.) judgment aggregation rules, and proving an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. It is shown that "conclusion-based voting" is less vulnerable to manipulation than "premise-based voting", which is str-prf. only for "reason-oriented" individuals (as: inds). Surprisingly, for "outcome-oriented" inds., the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. |
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