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| Author: | Scotchmer, S. |
| Title: | On price-taking equilibria in club economies with nonanonymous crowding |
| Journal: | Journal of Public Economics
1997 : JUL, VOL. 65:1, p. 75-88 |
| Index terms: | SMALL GROUPS ECONOMIC SYSTEMS COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Nonanonymous crowding has many interpretations. The most immediate is that members of a group have preferences over the types and relative numbers of other members. But "types" can also represent an exogenous feature like income. In coalition production the interpretation is that productivity requires diverse skills. A restrictive feature of all this work is that agents are characterized by a finite number of "types" which makes the model tractable but unrealistic. In reality workers in a firm can have varying skill levels that need to be chosen from a finite set of types. Members of clubs can be similar but not identical in their characteristics that impose negative or positive externalities. |
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