search query: @indexterm Negotiation / total: 621
reference: 178 / 621
| Author: | Banks, D.T. Hutchinson, J.W. Meyer, R.J. |
| Title: | Reputation in marketing channels: Repeated-transactions bargaining with two-sided uncertainty |
| Journal: | Marketing Science
2002 : SUMMER, VOL. 21:3, p. 251-272 |
| Index terms: | Marketing Consumer behaviour Negotiation Models USA |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Marketing channel interactions typically feature three characteristics that have not been incorporated together in an analytical study: 1. The parties can do business repeatedly over time, often under different terms of trade. 2. The terms that the seller offers one buyer may be different from those she offers another, giving each interaction the flavour of bilateral monopoly bargaining. 3. The buyer and seller come to the interaction uncertain about the valuation each holds for the good, but they do know each other's reputation for valuation. The seller might, e.g. come to the bargaining table aware that the buyer has strong reputation for being willing to pay only low prices, and the buyer might come aware that the seller is strongly reputed for high cost and is, therefore, willing to offer only high prices. |
SCIMA