search query: @indexterm Negotiation / total: 621
reference: 148 / 621
| Author: | Dukes, A. Gal-Or, E. |
| Title: | Negotiations and Exclusivity Contracts for Advertising |
| Journal: | Marketing Science
2003 : SPRING, VOL. 22:2, p. 222-245 |
| Index terms: | ADVERTISING MARKET STRUCTURE NEGOTIATION |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Exclusive advertising on a given media outlet is usually profitable for an advertiser because consumers are less aware of competing products. However, for such arrangements to exist, media must benefit as well. The authors examine conditions under which such exclusive advertising contracts benefit both advertisers and media outlets (referred to as stations) by illustrating that exclusive equilibria arise in a theoretical model of the media, advertisers, and consumers who participate in both the product and media markets. In the model, stations sell advertising space to advertisers and broadcast advertising messages to consumers. The paper also states that conditions leading to higher equilibrium levels of advertising can be unprofitable for advertisers. |
SCIMA