search query: @indexterm efficiency / total: 625
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Author: | Fredriksson, P. |
Title: | The political economy of public employment programs |
Journal: | Journal of Public Economics
1999 : JUN, VOL. 72:3, p. 487-504 |
Index terms: | POLITICAL ECONOMY LABOUR MARKETS EFFICIENCY |
Language: | eng |
Abstract: | What are the welfare implications of a political equilibrium where the choice of active labor market programs have to please the employed majority? This issue is examined in an equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargaining. It turns out that the welfare consequences depend on the nature of ALMPs and the political weight attributed to firm interests. If firm values carry little political weight and programs contribute to wage pressure, the employed will opt for excessive program activity. |
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