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| Author: | Schummer, J. |
| Title: | Strategy-proofness versus efficiency for small domains of preferences over public goods |
| Journal: | Economic Theory
1999 : VOL. 13:3, p. 709-722 |
| Index terms: | STRATEGY EFFICIENCY PUBLIC GOODS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | It has long been known that when agents have von Neumann- Morgenstern preferences over lotteries, there is an incompatibility between strategy-proofness and efficiency - a solution satisfying those properties must be dictatorial. the authors strengthen this result by showing that it follows from the same incompatibility on a series of much smaller domains of preferences. Specifically, the authors first show the incompatibility to hold on the authors' smallest domain, in which two agents are restricted to have linear preferences over one private good and one public good produced from the private good. |
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