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Author:Huck, S.
Müller, W.
Normann, H.-T.
Title:Stackelberg beats Cournot: on collusion and efficiency in experimental markets
Journal:Economic Journal
2001 : OCT, VOL. 111:474, p. 749-765
Index terms:COMPETITION
DUOPOLY
EFFICIENCY
Language:eng
Abstract:The authors report on an experiment designed to compare Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly markets with quantity competition. The authors implement both a random matching and a fixed-pairs version for each market. Stackelberg markets yield, regardless of the matching scheme, higher outputs than Cournot markets and, thus, higher efficiency. For Cournot markets, the authors replicate a pattern known from previous experiments. There is stable equilibrium play under random matching and partial collusion under fixed pairs.
SCIMA record nr: 226228
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