search query: @indexterm MANAGEMENT SELECTION / total: 64
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| Author: | Rosenstein, S. Wyatt, J. G. |
| Title: | Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth |
| Journal: | Journal of Financial Economics
1990 : AUG, VOL. 26:2, p. 175-191 |
| Index terms: | MANAGEMENT DIRECTORS MANAGEMENT SELECTION COMPANY PERFORMANCE SHAREHOLDERS WEALTH |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Management plays a dominant role in selecting outside directors, inviting skepticism about outsiders' ability to make independent judgements on firm performance. An empirical examination of wealth effects surrounding outside director appointments finds significantly positive share-price reactions. No clear evidence is found that outside directors of any particular occupation are more or less valuable than others. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that outside directors are chosen in the interest of shareholders. |
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