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| Author: | Abbring, J.H. (et al.) |
| Title: | Adverse selection and moral hazard in insurance: can dynamic data help to distinguish? |
| Journal: | Journal of the European Economic Association
2003 : APR-MAY, VOL. 1:2-3, p. 512-521 |
| Index terms: | Adverse selection Insurance Moral hazard |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Empirically distinguishing between adverse selection and moral hazard is a standard problem of applied contracts theory. It is shown that dynamic insurance data allow to distinguish moral hazard from dynamic selection on unobservables. In the presence of moral hazard, experience rating implies negative occurrence dependence: individual claim intensities decrease with the number of past claims. |
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