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Author:Jehiel, P.
Title:Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
Journal:Journal of Economic Theory
1999 : APR, VOL. 85:2, p. 258-293
Index terms:MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING
EXTERNALITIES
ECONOMICS
Language:eng
Abstract:In an auction with externalities, a buyer's type is multidimensional and specifies the payoff he would get for each of the N+1 possible outcomes: the seller keeps the object or buyer i (i=1, ...,N) gets the object. The authors provide a characterization of multidimensional incentive compatible mechanisms similar to that for one-dimensional mechanisms. Although reservation utilities are endogenous and type-dependent, the participation constraint is binding for only one "critical type".
SCIMA record nr: 194872
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