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Author:Dessein, W.
Title:Network competition in nonlinear pricing
Journal:RAND Journal of Economics
2003 : WINTER, VOL. 34:4, p. 593-611
Index terms:Networks
Pricing
Telecommunications industry
Language:eng
Abstract:Previous research, assuming linear pricing, has argued that telecommunications networks may use a high access charge as an instrument of collusion. It is shown in this article that this conclusion is difficult to maintain when operators compete in nonlinear pricing: 1) As long as subscription demand is inelastic, profits can remain independent of the access charge, even when customers are heterogenous and networks engage in second-degree price discrimination. 2) When demand for subscriptions is elastic, networks may increase profits by agreeing on an access charge below marginal cost.
SCIMA record nr: 255681
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