search query: @indexterm SIGNALING / total: 68
reference: 27 / 68
| Author: | Balachander, S. |
| Title: | Warranty Signalling and Reputation |
| Journal: | Management Science
2001 : SEP, VOL. 47:9, p. 1282-1289 |
| Index terms: | MARKETING STRATEGY COMPETITION SIGNALING GAME THEORY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In this paper, the authors present a signaling-based explanation for the empirical phenomenon that a longer warranty may be offered by a product with lower quality. The authors consider product market competition between an established incumbent product. The authors' explanation hinges on differences in consumer knowledge about reliability of established and newer products. In a product market where a new entrant competes with an established product, the authors show that signaling behavior leads to an outcome where the less reliable product may carry the longer warranty. The also paper provides a number of tables and figures and a substantial list of references on this subject. |
SCIMA