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| Author: | Ferrall, C. Shearer, B. |
| Title: | Incentives and transactions costs within the firm: estimating an agency model using payroll records |
| Journal: | Review of Economic Studies
1999 : APR, VOL. 66:2(227), p. 309-338 |
| Index terms: | ECONOMICS COMPANIES INCENTIVES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors estimate an agency model using the payroll of a copper mine that paid a production bonus to teams of workers. The authors estimate the cost of incomplete information due to insurance and incentives considerations and the inefficiency caused by the simple form of the incentive contract itself. At the estimated parameters the cost of worker risk aversion (insurance) is of similar magnitude to moral hazard (incentives). |
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