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| Author: | Ghatak, M. Morelli, M. Sjöström, T. |
| Title: | Occupational choice and dynamic incentives |
| Journal: | Review of Economic Studies
2001 : OCT, VOL. 68:4(237), s. 781-810 |
| Index terms: | AGENCY THEORY ENTREPRENEURSHIP INCENTIVES OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE OVERLAPPING-GENERATIONS MODELS WORKERS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Imperfections in the credit market give rise to rents in entrepreneurial activities involving capital. |
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