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Author: | Cadman, B. Carter, M.E. Hillegeist, S. |
Title: | The incentives of compensation consultants and CEO pay |
Journal: | Journal of Accounting & Economics
2010 : APR, VOL. 49:3, p.263-280 |
Index terms: | executives compensation consultants incentives |
Language: | eng |
Abstract: | This study investigates whether compensation consultants' potential cross-selling incentives explain more lucrative CEO pay packages. 755 firms from the S&P 1500 for 2006 is used in the study. Critics allege that incentives lead consultants to bias their advice to secure greater revenues from their clients (Waxman, H., 2007. Executive pay: conflicts of interest among compensation consultants. United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Majority Staff, December). It is unable to find evidence of higher levels of pay or lower pay-performance sensitivities for clients of consultants with potentially greater conflicts of interest among firms that retain consultans. Overall, no evidence is found to suggest that potential conflicts of interest between the firm and its consultant are a primary driver of excessive CEO pay. |
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