search query: @author Chang, C. / total: 7
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| Author: | Chang, C. |
| Title: | Payout policy, capital structure, and compensation contracts when managers value control |
| Journal: | Review of Financial Studies
1994 : WINTER, VOL. 6:4, p. 911-933 |
| Index terms: | PAY CAPITAL COMPENSATION |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The optimal contract between managers and investors is endogenously derived when managers have preferences for both monetary compensation and corporate resources under their control. When the optimal payout is privately known to managers, they can be induced to make payouts by linking their compensation to the payout. Public equity is a claim on this discretionary payout. If investors can obtain new information about the firm's optimal payout level, it can be utilized by transferring the control from management to investors. |
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