search query: @author Mitchell, R. / total: 7
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| Author: | Mitchell, R. |
| Title: | Regime design matters: international oil pollution and treaty compliance |
| Journal: | International Organization
1994 : SUMMER, VOL. 48:3, p. 425-458 |
| Index terms: | OIL POLLUTION ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Whether a treaty elicits compliance from governments or nonstate actors depends upon identifiable characteristics of the regime's compliance systems. Within the international regime controlling intentional oil pollution, a provision requiring tanker owners to install specified equipment produced dramatically higher levels of compliance than a provision requiring tanker operators to limit their discharges. Since both provisions entailed strong economic incentives for violation and regulated the same countries over the same time period, the variance in compliance clearly can be attributed to different features of the two subregimes. |
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