search query: @author Brandts, J. / total: 7
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| Author: | Brandts, J. MacLeod, W. |
| Title: | Equilibrium selection in experimental games with recommended play |
| Journal: | Games and Economic Behavior
1995 : OCT, VOL. 11:1, p. 36-63 |
| Index terms: | GAMES ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR ECONOMICS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper presents the results of experimental games with multiple Nash equilibria in which subjects were given suggestions for their play. This procedure allows for a direct test of the self-enforcement condition implicit in the Nash equilibrium concept. The results show that perfectness has cutting power in simple single-stage games. Also, off-equilibrium payoffs influence subjects' behavior. For two-stage games the authors find support for the position that subgame perfect equilibria are strategically stable and weak support for the concept of forward induction. |
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