search query: @author Moore, W. / total: 7
reference: 2 / 7
« previous | next »
Author:Lippert, R.
Moore, W.
Title:Monitoring versus bonding: shareholder rights and management compensation
Journal:Financial Management
1995 : AUTUMN, VOL. 24:3, p. 54-62
Index terms:FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
SHAREHOLDERS
RIGHTS ISSUES
Language:eng
Abstract:Using a sample of nearly 700 firms, the authors document a significant level of substitution between monitoring efforts by shareholders and bonding of Chief Executive Officers' (CEO) compensation with shareholder wealth. Direct shareholder monitoring effectiveness is measured by various dimensions of voting rights, e.g., equal voting, cumulative voting, and confidential voting. Indirect monitoring is measured by the degree of independence of the board of directors.
SCIMA record nr: 142715
add to basket
« previous | next »
SCIMA