search query: @author Kane, E. J. / total: 7
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| Author: | Kane, E. J. |
| Title: | Using deferred compensation to strengthen the ethics of financial regulation |
| Journal: | Journal of Banking and Finance
2002 : SEP, VOL. 26:9, p. 1919-1933 |
| Index terms: | ETHICS GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL REGULATION DEPOSIT INSURANCE |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Defects in the corporate governance of government- owned enterprises tempt opportunistic officials to breach duties of public stewardship. Corporate-governance theory suggests that incentive-based deferred compensation could intensify the force that common-law duties actually exert on regulatory managers. In principle, a forfeitable fund of deferred compensation could be combined with provisions for measuring, verifying, and rewarding multiperiod performance to make top regulators accountable for maximizing the long-run net social benefits their enterprise produces. Because government deposit-insurance enterprises are purveyors of credit enhancements for which private substitute and reinsurance markets exist. |
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