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Author:Desai, M.A.
Dharmapala, D.
Title:Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives
Journal:Journal of Financial Economics
2006 : FEB, VOL. 79:2, p. 145-179
Index terms:corporate governance
incentives
stock options
tax avoidance
tax evasion
Language:eng
Abstract:This article examines the relationship between the growth of incentives such as stock options for managers and corporate tax avoidance. The authors develop a model to demonstrate how incentives influence management’s tax sheltering decisions. Corporate tax avoidance is measured with the book-tax gap not attributable to accounting accruals. This allows the link between tax avoidance and incentive compensation to be investigated. The results suggest that increases in incentive compensation tend to reduce the level of tax sheltering.
SCIMA record nr: 260710
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