search query: @author Gaimon, C. / total: 7
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| Author: | Gaimon, C. |
| Title: | Dynamic game results on the acquisition of new technology. |
| Journal: | Operations Research
1989 : MAY-JUN, VOL. 37:3, p. 410-425 |
| Index terms: | PRICING CAPACITY TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION GAME THEORY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | A dynamic two-player game is presented to examine the competitive advantages offered by new technology which has the ability to reduce a firm's unit production cost. In an open-loop approach, a firm makes an irreversible commitment to a course of action. An example of open-loop strategy is a firm's commitment to keep all of its employees occupied regardless of realized business conditions. Alternatively, using a closed-loop strategy, the firm's actions evolve over time, permitting it to react continuously to competitive conditions. Numerical results indicate that due to the greater cost of acquiring and maintaining capacity the open-loop game players earn lower profits over the planning horizon. |
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