search query: @author Haslam, J. / total: 7
reference: 6 / 7
| Author: | Barnes, P. Chakravarty, S. P. Haslam, J. |
| Title: | Bargaining power, dissimulation and takeovers in a rational market with asymmetric information |
| Journal: | Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
1990 : AUTUMN, VOL. 17:4, p. 529-539 |
| Index terms: | BARGAINING POWER MARKETING INFORMATION MERGERS BIDDING |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | A bargaining model of a merger involving share exchange is examined in which directors of the bidder may dissimulate. It is shown that there is an incentive for them to over or understate synergy, depending on their perceptions of relative bargaining power. The ambiguity of the offer has implications for merger policy and the regulation of information. |
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