search query: @author Clemenz, G. / total: 7
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| Author: | Clemenz, G. |
| Title: | Loans for projects with interdependent returns |
| Journal: | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
1991 : JUN. VOL, 147:2, p. 337-353 |
| Index terms: | MODELS MATHEMATICAL MODELS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The paper analyzes a model of a credit market with symmetric information, in which the return of each project to be financed is negatively correlated with the number and qualities of competing projects. Though all loan applicants are identical, in equilibrium some are rejected, despite the fact that they are willing to pay an interest rate above the ruling one. However, if there is a competition among lenders, the total number of the projects performed remains unchanged. |
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